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PREFACE
I would like to use this section to clarify several asnects
of this naper which make it different from the standard research
paner. First, this paper is the culmination of nearly ten months
of working on this issue, as such it is
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subject that I am tho-

roughly familiar with. This familiarity has enabled me to incorporate a lot of material into

8

fairly condensed form. For examnle

in the section on Agreement Annexes I make reference to the course
of the negotiations quite frequently. These references are for the
most part one

s.~tence

notes. However, to arrive at these abbre-

viated conclusions required breaking down nine sets of the

ne~o

tiating-delegation'sworkingpapers, chronologically, on a species by area basis, and nutting this breakdown into

tabul~r

form.

I have not annexed this material to this paner because of the
sheer volume involved. In the same vein I have mentioned the
House Hearings held on this issue several times in the course of
this naper. I did not deem it necessary, for the purnoses of this
paper)to include the testimony I prepared for these Hearings in
order to make these observations.
A second aspect of this paner which needs clarification is
the absence of footnotes. I did not consider these necessary or
pratical for the following reasons. Being a conteMporary issue
there hasn't really been much nublished material on it. There
has, in the last six months, been several trade journal and newspaper articles on the Treaty, such as the June issue of the
Maine Commercial Fisheries. However, the information for most of
these was obtained from myself or associates who also worked on
this project. The technical information and catch data contained
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in this paper comes from either compQter print OQts obtained
from the Northeast Fisheries Center, the NMFS Data SQmmary on
this Treaty, the NMFS Short RQn Economic Analysis of this
Agreement, the Agreement itself, or general knowledge. Information from these SOQrces is interspersed throQghoQt this paper in a hodge podge fashion and it was simply impratical to
Qse footnotes. Two specific references do need to be made.
Ther.is sOllIe . geogranhical information contained in the
Abstract of this paner which was obtained from an article in
OceanQs by Dr. Alexander. Also, on page seventeen of this paper
there is a one sentence sQmmary on the number of Treaties concluded with Canada since 1950. This one sentence renresents
thirty five hours of research done by Dudley Baker, a student
in the Marine Affairs Program, in a professional canacity for
the American Fisheries Defense Committee. I WOQ1d also like to
acknowledge the

ins}ght~I gain~d~about

this i§sue

ftoro~othe~

members of the A.F.D.C. and other people I met while working
on this project.
Thoughout this pauer, when defining the various issues
and problems, constant cross reference is made to Canada's
position in relation to this Treaty. This is not meant to
knock Canada or imply that Canadian fishermen are an inherent
evil when they are in U.S. waters. It is just that in this particular business Canada was the opnosition. Most people I know
express admiration for the Canadian negotiators and the deal they
were able to secure for their industry.
The U.S. government, in defense of this Agreement, has

II

,

.
enumerated a number of benefits to be gained, and dire consequences to be avoided, with the ratification and implimentabion
of this Agreement. These are perceived as such because of a particular point of view. The government's position is not presented
in this paper, although several points are used for the purpose
of illustration.

I would refer the reader to the various papers

published by the government if one is interested in this perspective.
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ABSTRACT
The U.S.-Canadian East Coast Fisheries Resource Agreement,
signed March 29, 1979, is a bilateral agreement which stipulates
terms for the management and allocation of, and access to, fishery resources located on Georges Bank, in the Gulf of Maine, and
substantial tracts of adjacent waters in the U.S. and Canadian
200-mile fishery zones. For the purposes of this Agreement, the
old ICNAF designations were used in defining the different geographical regions covered by this Agreement. These are Areas 4V,

4W, 4X,

5Y, 52 (east and west), and 6. Area

4

is predominantly

Canadian waters and 5 and 6 are predominantly U.S. waters. Also
signed on this date was a " Treaty To Submit To Binding Dispute
Settlement The Delimitation Of The Maritime Boundary In The Gulf
Of Maine Area". The U.S. and Canada have a long standing dispute
over the location of the international boundary in this area.
This maritime dispute has been particulary acute since 1977 when
both countries enacted 200- mile fishery conservation zones which
overlap. The U.S. claim encompasses all of Georges Bank, considering it as a natural prolongation of the U.S. c0ntinental shelf.
The basis for this claim is the concept of special circumstances
or equitable principles, which are accepted norms in international forums, such as UNCLOS III, for delimiting maritime boundaries.
Their validity in this particular instance is yet to be determined.
Canada's claim encompasses the northern third of Georges Bank as
part of their 200-mile fisheries zone. This claim is based on the
equidistance formula and also is an accepted international norm.
The area of overlapping claims is approximately 5,500 square nautical miles in area, is an extremely productive fishing ground,
and fishermen of both nations have established rights in this
1

region. There are also two areas to the north of this one where
ownership is yet to be determined. The first of these is an area
of approximately 1400 square nautical miles located between
Georges Bank and Machias Seal Island, and the other is approximatley 400 square nautical miles around Machias Seal Island.
This Treaty, and two accompany Agreements outline the procedue
by which this dispute will to submitted to binding third party
settlement. They do not actually settle the dispute and it will
very likely be several years before the boundary is

finally

determined. This is likely because the first stage of this procedure is to submit the dispute to a snecial chamber of the IeJ.
If this chamber is not constituted within six months after

th~se

Agreements enter into force; then the two Parties have the option
of submitting the dispute to a court of arbitration, composed of
five persons mutually agreed upon by the two governments. As
such the time framework for the actual delimitation of the boundary is an unknown variable. The Fisheries and Boundary Dispute
Agreements are linked by the fact that neither can enter into
force unless both do.
During 1977 an interim agreement was in effect which allowed
fishermen of both countries access into the other's undisputed
zone, allowed both to continue fishing in the disputed zone with
no expansion of effort, and excluded third parties from the disputed zone. This interim regime broke down in mid-1978 over disagreement about menagement policies and levels of effort in the
Georges Bank groundfish and scallop fisheries. As a result both
countries now prohibit the other from fishing in their undisputed zones. This situation is pointed to by the U.S. Government

2

as a reason why this Fisheries Agreement should be accepted at
this point in time. Failure to do so will result in "anarchy"
on Georges Bank. Perhaps, but regardless of an agreement U.S.
fishermen will be operating under FMP's promulgated by the
NERFMC, and Canada has a long record of sound management

001-

icies. Both countries have too much at stake in the long run
to allow any type

o~

rampage by their fishermen.

The Fisheries and Boundary Dispute Agreements have been
sent to the Senate Foreign Reletions Committee where they are
pending action. Due to the discontentment with the Fisheries
Agreement, by large segments of the fishing industry, there is
a strong possibility that reservations to certain aspects of it
will be attached before the Agreement is sent to the floor for
a ratification vote. Canadian officials have stated that any
changes made to the Agreement, as signed, would be unacceptable
and would negate the entire deal. This remains to be seen.
The House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
and the Environment held hearings on this issue on 6/22/79. It
is unusual for the House to hold hearings before a treaty is
ratified. This occured in this partiCUlar instance because of
the interest and controversy generated over this issue. A basic commitment was made at these hearings to the effect that
nothing would be incoroorated into the implimenting legislation,
after this Treaty were ratified, that would infringe upon the
prerogatives of the fishing industry or Regional Councils, as
defined in the FCMA.

3

INTRODUCTION
This analysis of the U.S.-Canadian East Coast Fisheries
Resource Agreement was initiated at the request of a group of
fishing industry representatives concerned about some of the
terms enumerated in this document. The purpose behind this research project was threefold. First, to determine if this
Agreement was consistent with the intent of the FCMA. There was
considerable concern about the management provisions contained
therein and the role of the Regional Councils in relationship
to the federal government. It was felt that this Agreement had
the potential for diminishing industry's prerogative in these
areas. Second, to determine the economic impact of this Treaty
upon the New England fishing industry. Logically enough this
was an overriding concern. The third purpose, which is not in
the scope of this paper, was to aid in determing what the response of the user groups should be.
I raise this point about industry impetus right off for a
very simple reason. If you are concerned about the interests of
an industry, and a conflict exist with another sector, then
there is a tendency to reject assumptions which might be Rccep....
ted by others. In this case there were certain assumptions used
by the federal government, in negotiating this Treaty, which
from an industry perspective are detrimental.
For example, the U.S. negotiators accented the years 196577 as the basis on which to determine both countries share enti

tlements under the Agreement. This thirteen year span was

4

supposed to reflect a historical perspective as to both

coun~

tries annual average harvest. On the basis of these averages
the two sides received certain percentages as their final
share entitlement. If you accept this thirteen year span as
adequate then, as is pointed out as a benefit of this

Agreemen~

"the shares of the total allowa.ble catch (TAC) which the U.S.
is entitled to take under the Agreement exceed the historical
U.S. shares in the case of sixteen stocks". However, this basic thirteen year parameter, from an industry perspective, is
inadequate for very valid reasons. These years were the most
intensive ones for foreign fishing activities up and down the
Eastern seaboard anywhere outside the twelve-mile zone and in
particular on Georges Bank. This activity included a tremendous growth in the presence of a subsidized Canadian fleet on
Georges Bank. More importantly this thirteen year snan does
not take into account a very fundamental change in U.S. policy and what has occured since the implimentation of the FCMA
in 1977.
Another basic assumption used in defending this Agreement
is that future U.S. harvests (1980) would be the same with or
without a Treaty. The reasoning here is that FMP's dev el oped by
the NERFMC will put the same ceilings on U.S. harvests as will
this Treaty. This

i~

not known and is certainly not supported

by recent growth rates in the harvest of certain stocks.
A breakdown of the scallop share issue demonstrates the inadequacy of these two basic assumptions. First, the average U.S.
scallop harvest in the 1965-77 period was 19.9% and under the
Agreement it is 26.65%. However, if one looks at the 1944-77
period( which is perhaps more of a historical perspective) the

5

u.s.

average share was 59.9%. On the other hand the U.S. share

in 1977 and 1978 was 26.9% and 31.4% respectively. This translates into a 17.5 and 31.1 million dollar harvest in 1977 and

1978. Under the Agreement, using projected TAC's, the U.S.
scallop industry will be reduced from a harvest of 5569 metric
tons in 1978 to 3652 metric tons the first year of the Treaty.
This 35% reduction represents a loss of anproximately $10
million. In view of recent harvests, recent investments, and
the state of this stock in waters clearly U.S.( which is explained further into this p8'Oer) to expect this industry to accept this type of loss is asinine.
OBSERVATIONS
The first stage of this research project was one of attending meetings, talking with participants, and general observation. Due to this issue's contemporary nature this was the best,
and only, way to gain some insight into the style of the negotiations and the various issues. I believe these observations
are relevant because

cognizanc~

of'these contributes to a more

complete understanding of the issue.
In the negotiations with Canada the U.S. was represented by
a special Ambassador to Canada, who was assisted by a State Dept.
and NMFS staff. This staff was composed of lawyers, 'Oolicy planners, statisticians, etc. Also serving on the U.S. side was an
advisory panel of fourteen representatives from the fishing industry. As one would expect, the composition of this panel reflected the diversity of the New England industry. Several of
these advisors doubled as members of the NERFMC. The function
of this panel was to provide input to insure that the interests
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and needs of the fishing industry were perceived and incorporated into the U.S. position. The forum for this input was
meetings, usually in Boston, of the entire U.S. side, either
prior to or following a

negotiati~g

session with the Canadian

side. At these meetings the negotiations would be updated and
information and viewpoints would be exchanged. The advisory
panel did not participate in the actual negotiations.
The one preconceived notion that I had when I first approached this issue was, given the nature of the industry and
resource, there would be an adbundance of problems facing solution and complaints being voiced. This expectation was amply realized. One heard that"the governement was giving it
away" and "trying to screw the industry". However, beyond the
rhetoric some concrete issues were being addressed.
Some of these issues reflected the self interest needs of
the various segments of the fishing industry. F.i., there was
a conflict over the issue of balancing an allocation for U.S.
redfishermen in Canadian waters with a Canadian allocation for
loligo squid in U.S. waters. Northern Maine redfishermen were,
logically enough, primarily interested in securing the most advantageous deal for their industry. They developed this industry
and were concerned about its health if access into Canadian waters
was not reinstated. On the other hand, Southern New England, and
Mid-Atlantic, representatives were concerned about granting
Canada access, for the first time, into the squid fishery and
possible bycatch and gear conflict problems. Additionally, in
the last couple of years segments of the American industry have
been attempting to develop their capacity to exploit this
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resource, primarily for the export market. I heard concern expressed about competing in a foreign market with a product harvested in U.S. waters. Another signifiQant issue was the dissatisfaction expressed over the allocation U.S. scallopers were to
receive on Georges Bank. It was viewed as inadequate in relation
to the fact that the greater portion of Georges Bank is already
clearly U.S. waters, and the disputed zone is still up for grabs.
Another problem was the worth of the U.S. groundfish allocation
in Canadian waters compared to the Canadian allocation in U.S.
waters.
Despite, and in addition to, these differences there were
some areas of common dissatisfaction. A common complaint was
that industry positions were not being taken seriously by the
government. For example, at the meating where the duration of
this Agreement was discussed there was some disagreement amongst
the advisory panel as to the desirability of a three year agreement as opposed to a five year agreement as opnosed to a ten
year agreement. However, there was a consensus as to the undesirability of a permanent resource agreement. Yet this condition
was accepted by the U.S. negotiators and incorporated into the
final text.
Equally vexing was the whole question of why wasn't the U.S.
government using one of its best available levers in negotiating
a better deal. I am refering to the importance of the U.S. domestic market to the Canadian fishing industry. The U.S. market
is Canada's prime export market for products such as cod, haddock, lobster, and scallops. In 1977 alone Canada exported over

$100 million worth of cod products to the U.S. Overall in 1977,
the US.-Canadian balance of trade in fish products was over $,31
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million in favor of Canada. These products come into this country
with very little or no tariff duties imposed on them. In addition
is the fact that the Canadian fleet is a well subsidized one. The
efforts of the fishing industry and academic community to petition
the Treasury Dept. to impose countervai.ling duties are well
known and documented. The failure of the government to use this
situation as a bargaining tool gave the impression that the noncompetitive advantage enjoyed by Canada in our mutual fish market was simply being reaffirmed.
Another general area of concern was the notion of what
other aspects of U.S.-Canada relations were being considered in
relation to the negotiations on this resource Agreement. There
are numerous other areas of mutual concern between the two
countries which equal or surpass the economic and political importance of a Fisheries Agreement. The questicn was if the fishing industry were being asked to sacrifice its interests then
what were the other considerations? The government line was that
this Agreement was being negotiated on its own merit without any
cross reference to other issues, including potential oil and gas
exploration on Georges Bank. This position was perplexing as it
is very unlikely that anyone international issue will oper-a.t e :"
in a vacuum. However given this insistence, any deficiencies in
the Agreement are that more striking.
The extent of industry dissatisfaction with this Agreement
is reflected in a few facts. Several members of the advisory
panel, and others, financed and actively organized an opposition
to this Agreement,i.e., the American Fisheries Defense Committee.
This committee's position was supported by a variety of industry

9

organizations and businesses, both coastwise and nationally. In
fact, its objections were supported by and did reflect those of
a clear majority of the fishing industry in New England. Also
consider that at the House hearings on this issue, Congressman
Studds asked the question" why were ten" of the fourteen industry advisors opposed to the Agreement, '.is sIgned, with the remaining four having reservations about certain aspects of it"?
The tendency of the U.S. negotiators not to take into full
account the wishes of the fishing industry seems to have carried over to the treatment received by the NERFMC. There were
several requests made early on in the negotiations by the NERFMC
which were not realized nor incorporated into the U.S. negotiating nosition or the final settlement. These requests were made
in the form of letters from the Council to the State Dent. or
its special negotiator. One of these requests was that Council
members be included as active narticipants in the negotiations.
This was reasonable considering that the stocks under consideration were under the NERFMC's jurisdiction. As it turned out
the Council was relegated to the same advisory nosition as the
industry. Another recommendation was that the boundary disnute
be settled before the negotiation of a fisheries agreement. Obviously this request was not realized either. Additionally the
Council had explicitly stated that redfish, among others, be
considered only on a transboundary basis,i.e., joi.t management.
Yet in the final settlement Canada secured exclusive management
authority over redfish in 4VWX.
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In analyzing the actual Agreement I snlit the work into
two broad areas.
Agreement.

The first focuses on the

25

Articles of the

These Articles nrovide the basic guidelines for the

overall operation of this Treaty.

These Articles are fairly

explicit in the sense that upon reading them one gets a clear
idea as to how the principles and concents of this Agreement are
supnose to operate once it enters into force.
looks and is good.

On naper it 911

However, some problems are discernible when

some of these terms are annlied to repl conditions end situations.
For example, granting Canada mAnagement rights in U.S. waters is
necessary for the purposes of this Agreement in its present
form.

However this action seems contrary to the principle of

exclusive jurisdiction as defined in Sec. 102 of the FCMA.

This

action also seems premature because once the boundary is determined, certain stocks on Georges Bank which are now deemed transboundary due to the existence of a disputed zone, Gnd which
provide the justification for Canadian management rights in U.S.
waters, may no longer be considered as such.
The second section summarizes the Annexes of this Treaty.
These Annexes ("A", "B",

"c" )

provide the snecific terms of

both countries shares, management rights, and access into the
different geographic areas.

A synopsis of these Annexes com-

prises Appendix A of this paner.

Also included in this summary

are notes on the course of the negotiations as derived from the
various working paners of the U.S. negotiating team.
AGREEMENT ARTICLES
The first 17 Articles of this Agreement are concerned with
the establishment of a fishery management ennaratus and its
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procedural guidelines.

The two Parties (U.S. And Canada) are

to each apnoint seven members to fill their resnective national
sections, with the two sections to compose a joint fisheries
commission.

These members serve at the pleasure of their resnec-

tive governments.

The U.S. side will be composed of two federRl

officials, three members of the New England Regional Fisheries
Management Council, and two members of the Mid-Atlantic Regional
Fisheries Management Council.

Decisions which fall within the

purview of the U.S. side of the Commission will be made according to majority rule, and at the Commission level the U.S.
side will present a singular stance.

For decisions falling

within the purview of the Commission each side will have one
vote and Commission action will require concurrence.
The two Parties will jointly appoint two Co-chairmen who
will serve at the pleasure of the appointing Parties.

These

Co-chairmen are empowered to make binding decisions with regard
to disputes over management measures.
other Commission disputes.

They can hear and decide

However, in these instances the Parties

have the right, jointly or independently, to appeal the Co-chairmen's decision to the Arbitrator.
The Arbitrator is appointed jointly by the Parties for a
five-year renewable term, and serves at the nleasure of the
Parties.

This Arbitrator is to be national of neither Canada

or the U.S..

If the Parties cannot agree on the selection of

an Arbitrator, the President of the ICJ will be asked to appoint
one.

All disputes and actions taken under the Agreement are, in

fact, referable ultimately to the Arbitrator.

The arbitration

process under this Agreement basically parallels that of a
courtroom, with the submission of evidence, the calling of
12

witnesses, examination, and cross-examination.

The Arbitrator's

decisions are to be final and binding upon the Parties, with
either Party having the right to request a review.
In addition to appointing all the participants in this
rather elaborate management apparatus, the two national governments also have an active role in the formulation and execution
of measures.

If the Commission cannot agree on matters of

business a dispute can be refered to the Parties, the Co-chairmen, or the Arbitrator for resolution, in this order.

For

example, if the Commission does not agree on joint management
measures, the two governments themselves are empowered to
negotiate and settle the differences.

Failing agreement between

these two, the matter is then refered to the Co-chairmen for
resolution.

This alternative decision making process seems

logical and necessary, and it probably is.

However what is trou-

blesome is the fact that even if the Commission does agree on
management measures the Parties have the right to intervene and
object.

In the case of joint management if the Commission

agrees on measures the Parties still have thirty days to push
the matter to the Co-chairmen.

The point is that the Commission

is fUlly subject to government intervention.
Other types of decisions are handled directly by the
national governments and never come before the Commission for
consideration, such as filling appointments.

Also, Article

IX of the Agreement provides for the renegotiation of the share
entitlements every ten years.

However this will occur only if

either or both of the Parties request it.

Overall the decision

making role of the Commission would appear to be somewhat
emasculated.
11

Types of decisions to be made by this new management
apparatus include the annual setting of the total allowable
catch (TAC) for the various species covered by the Agreement,
the establishment of relevant management measures, and the
setting of the fishing year.

Other management measures can

include the designation of fishing zones, gear regulations,
and trip limits.
Article X of this Agreement lists seven guiding principles which are to be considered and adhered to when management action and decisions are being initiated.

The first

three are the concept of optimum yield, the use of best scientific information, and the inter-relationship of stocks. These
principles are the same as those in Sec. 301, National Standards,
of the FCMA.

In matters of praticality these standards are very

difficult to define and apply in the formulation of FMP's.
This difficulty is apparent if one considers the problems that
the NERFMC has had in the last two years in these matters.

The

point has been raised that these concepts will be even more
difficult to interpert and apply on a bilateral level, especially
if in conjuction with en elaborate management system.

The last

four guidelines in Article X pertain in particular to the
operation of this Agreem:ent.

These include efficient· adminis-

tration, minimization of costs, avoidance of unnecessary duplication, avoidance of disruptive changes in fishing patterns,
assuring each party the opportunity to harvest its entitlement,
insuring each party access where provided for in the Annexes,
and nondiscrimination.

14

There are basically three

dec~sion

making procedures to be

followed in the formulation of management plAns.
The first is the joint management (Category A) of those
stocks listed in Annex A.

For these the Commission initiates

the management proposals, and if it cannot agree the two governments's attempt to do so.

If direct Party negotiations fail the

Commission can reconvene or the matter CBn go to the Co-chairmen.
Moreover, if the Commission does agree on initiated proposals
the Parties can still object and have this matter submitted to
the Co-chairmen for resolution.

If the Co-chairmen do not reach

an accord then either Party may refer the dispute to the Arbitrator.

After the Agreement is in force management decisions can

remain in effect beyond a specified fishing year until new plans
are concluded.
The second procedure is where one of the Parties has the
primary responsibility (Category B) for initiating management
plani for those stocks listed in Annex B of the Treaty.

The

Party of primary interest proposes management measures to the
Commission, which can either agree with these or propose
modifications.

However if the Party of primary interest objects

to any modifications by the Commission then they do not enter into force.

Additionally the other Party can also contest the

consistency of proposed plans or modifications, in relation to
Article X, and by so contesting the matter is then refered to the
Co-chairmen for consideration.

The Co-chairmen are to be gUided

by this Article in their determinations.

If the Co-chairmen are

unable to settle then the matter will be decided by the Arbitrator.
I have heard quite a few people, who are involved in fisheries

15

management, make the observation that in terms of providing
both parties the opnortunity to participate in the formulation
of management plans, there is not much difference between
Category A and Category B management procedures.
The third procedure provides that one of the Parties will
exercise exclusive jurisdiction (Category C) over the management of those stocks listed in Annex C of the Treaty.

This

category is similar to Sec. 102, ExclusiYe Fishery Management
Authority, of the FCMA.

The Commission serves only as a forum

for consultation for Annex C stocks.

The only obligation of the

designated party is to provide the other party

~ith

access and

entitlements as stipulated in Annex C.
Entitlements are established for each of the stocks listed
in the three Annexes.

The basis for these percentages was

explained in the introduction.

Additionally, Article IX pro-

vides for the renegotiation of the share entitlements every ten
years, if the Parties request.
is as follows:

The formula for these adjustments

If a Party had an entitlement of

50% or more

upon entry into force of this Agreement, then it may be reduced
by as much as 10% of this at ten year intervals.
entitlement was less than

If its original

50% the reduction is limited to 5%.

These ten year incremental adjustments are limited to an overall
reduction of one-third of a Party's original share.

If the

Parties cannot agree on an adjustment the Arbitrator is empowered
to do so.

The

Arbitra~or

is to be guided in his decisions by

the location of the stock in relation to the boundary, to reduce
economic and social impacts on coastal communities, and significant
changes in the value, adbundance, or availibility of the stocks.

16

·

.
Article IX is seen by proponents of the Agreement as providing
a necessary amount of flexibility in is what an otherwise
inflexible agreement.

This provision provides for change and

is therefore viewed as

8

type of safeguard.

However, in several

important instances these appear to be onesided safeguards which
protect Canada's interest more than the U.S.

F.i., if the U.S.

wins the boundary dispute all of the Georges Bank scalloping
grounds would be in our FCZ.

Yet it would still take the U.S.

at least 30 years to have its share entitlement for scallops
adjusted upward to 50%.
prec(luded.

At this point any further gains are

If the U.S. were to lose the boundary dispute out-

right, two-thirds of Georges Bank scalloping grounds would
still be under U.S. jurisdiction.

Yet theorectically the U.S.

scallop share could be reduced to 17%.

In the case of herring,

Canada's share in 5z and 6 will always be at least 22% of the
TAC.

This is much more than any type of previous performance

by Canada in this area.

Regardless of the boundary settlement

CBnada will, in perpetuity, have 12% of the cod in 5Z and 14%
of the haddock in area 5.

On the other hand the U.S. is guaranteed

only 5% of the cod. inJ,.:X end 6% of the haddock in 4VWX.
Once management plans are in force they are to be enforced
by each Party in its respective undisputed zone.

Pending

delimitation of the maritime boundary enforcement in the disputed
zone is by the flag state.

In areas of exclusive jurisdiction

that Party can require permits and observers.
Amendments to the Agreement can be made at any time the Parties agree to them.

Included in this could be an agreement to

terminate this Treaty.

However, barring this occurence the Treaty

is, for all intents and purnoses, a permanent one.
17

This is stipu-

lated in Article XXV, Sec. 2, which states "this Agreement
shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of the
Parties".

The only exception is

i~

the IeJ chamber to settle

the maritime dispute is not constituted within six months and the
Court of Arbitration is not constituted within a year and a
hal~

after the Arbitration Agreement enters into

~orce.

If

these requirements are not met then either party may abrogate
the Fisheries Agreement.
because

This situation is not likely to develop

stumbling block to the settlement of the maritime

boundary had been the allocation

o~

fishery resources.

The

Fisheries Agreement takes care of this problem and as such the
boundary settlement becomes a secondary issue.
What this means is that the U.S. can negate or withdraw
from this Treaty only with Canadian concurrence.

This is not

likely to occur giveri Canada's adamant position that the Fisheries
Ag"eement be a permanent one.

The customary norm for the U.S.

in concluding bilateral agreements or entering into multilateral conventions has been to provide

~or

a specific termin-

ation date or a provision for unilateral withdrawal followip.g
notification.

In the case of fisheries, and prior to the FCMA,

the U.S. concluded numerous fishery agreements.

These were

either with nations desiring to fish off our coasts, such as
the Soviet Union, or conventions like ICNAF.

Since the FCMA

the U.S. has concluded numerous GIFA's with nations desiring
access in our FCZ for their distant-water-fleets.

Specifically,

with Canada, since 1950, the U.S. has concluded 230 bilateral
agreements,

thirteen of which pertain to fisheries, with two

of these requiring

rati~ication.
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In 1977 and 1978 the U.S. end

Canada operated under interim agreements for the same stocks
now being considered on a permanent basis.

Of all these past

agreements none have contained such option limiting clauses
as this particular Agreement.

Of course, agreements have been

concluded which could exist in perpetuity if the parties agree,
but all concerned still have unilateral rights.

In this sense

this Treaty is an abberation from the norm.
This permanence could be troublesome for a variety of
reasons.

First, if there are legitimate complaints about cer-

tain terms in the Annexes in reference to management or access
rights then these inequities will be around for a long time.
An industry perspective of this Agreement is that basically it
is a business deal, and it is bad business to do business on a
permanent basis.

Bear in mind that it was Canada's position

that this be a permanent deal and that it enter into force prior
to the determination of a maritime boundary.

It is doubtful that

anyone would want to set something in stone if they were making
out badly.

From a business point of view, an important resource

allocation issue is being settled before the primary fact of
ownership has been determined.
Another cause for concern is the effect this permanency
could have on the development of alternative approaches to
fishery management.

F.i., under this Agreement the various

species are locked into the different management categories,
which in effect could restrict these to a uni-species apnroach.
However, recently the New England and Mid-Atlantic Councils
have been experimenting with a mUlti-species approach to
management, as evidenced by the work on Groundfish and Atlantic
Demersal Finfish FMP's.

Another considerAtion is what effect
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will Canadian participation in the management of such underutilized species as pollock, whiting, and cusk have on work
such as that of the Fisheries Development Task Force.

Also,

the NERFMC recently adopted a resolution to consider snawning
closures and mesh size as an alternative to the quota system
in determin.ing permissible levels of commercial catch.

This

Agreement mandates the use of a TAC system, a concept which
could be out of date before it enters into force.

Overall

council decisions would be SUbject to Canada's purview through
the "A" and "B" management systems.

Is this" type of situation

contrary to the intent of the FCMA?
Another point has been raised abGut the relationship of the
Councils to the Secretary of Commerce under the Agreement in
comparison to the FCMA.

Under the FCMA, Sec. 304, Action by the

Secretary, the Secretary reviews FMPs submitted by the councils,
and if he disapproves the council is notified as to the reasons
and suggest changes for resubmission.
on the amendments or changes.

The councils get to work

Under the Agreement, and accord-

ing to a draft of the implimenting legislation which would follow
ratification, if, in review of FMP's submitted by the appropriate
council for submission to the Commission, the Secretary discerns
inconsistency with the governing principles of the Agreement, he
is empowered to modify the plan and then only notify the council
of the change.

However, this was only a draft and at the House

Hearings commitments were made by Congressmen to the effect that
if this Treaty were ratified, nothing would be written into the
implimenting legislation that would diminish the role of the
councils as defined by the FCMA.
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AGREEMENT ANNEXES
On a species by area basis this section will summarize
the speciric terms or the negotiations and rinal settlements.
With regard to the negotiations the purpose was to touch on the
more salient points or the give and take and to show who was
doing the compromising.

These notes are drawn rrom the various

working papers or the U.S. negotiating team.

In rererence to .

the rinal settlements I have attempted to analyze those terms
or the Annexes, either shares, management, or access, which are
viewed as problematic to the interest or the rishing industry
in New England.
Mackerel: Reaching agreement on this species does not
appear to have been very dirricult.
set jointly ror ICNAF Areas

3,4,5,&

receiving 60% and Canada 40%.

The TAC is to be

6, with the U.S.

Fishing by each country

ror its entitlements is to occur only within its own
undisputed waters and in the disputed zone until the
boundary is determined.

Beyond the setting or the TAC

each country, in its own waters, is to establish management regulations pursuant to Category "B" procedure.
The reason agreement was easily reached is that there
is enough mackerel to go around, especially since the
cutback in third countries rishing ror this.
TAC ror these rour areas is over

53

The projected

thousand metric tons.

In 1978 the U.S. harvested only 1300 metric tons and
Canada harvested 22,000 metric tons.
Pollock:

There was agreement rrom the start that pollock

would be jointly managed, then it was agreed that there be
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reciprocal fishing in Areas 4X and 5Ze.

The problem

with regard to this stock is the final share entitlement.
The U.S. had originally requested 30% of the TAC and in the
end settled for 25.6%.

While the U.S. eRme down

4.4%

from its original position, Canada did not alter its original
position.

This final share do not reflect the recent

increases in the harvest of this stock by N.E. fishermen.
In 1977 the U.S. caught 34% of the U.S./Ca. total, and in
1978 it was up to 40%.

Using projected TAC's the U.S.

catch will be reduced to 10,200 metric tons the first year
of the Agreement, from 17,700 metric tons in 1978.

This is

a 43% reduction and represents a loss of anproximately 2.75
million dollars.

In absolute terms this may not be that

much, however this could have a concentrated impact on a
port such as Gloucester, which in 1978 landed over onethird of the N.E. pollock harvest.

On the other hand the

Canadian share under the Agreement is an increase over its
1978 harvest.

The real crux of this problem is that U.S.

fishermen arnfisheries managers contend that more pollock
is available in U.S. waters than the U.S. receives under the
Agreement.

This contention is borne out not only by the 1978

harvest but also by" the NMFS Data Summary package for this
Agreement, table 1-4.

Additionally, access into Canadian

waters for pollock, under the Agreement, would appear to be
of limited usefulness in light of past performances by U.S.
fishermen in those waters.

The U.S. average harvest for

pollock in Area 4X for the 1963-1975 period was only 538
metric tons.
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Cusk: The Canadian proposals for dealing with this stock
-prevailed
throughout the negotiations and comprise the
final settlement.

This stock was covered only in Area 5Ze.

The U.S. had proposed that it manage this stock pursuant
to Category "B" procedures.

Canada's proposal was for joint

management and in fact this was adopted, as was the Canadian
proposal on share entitlements.

The U.S. % of the U.S./Ca.

total for the years 1976-78 averaged 50%, and under the
Agreement its share is 34%.

The value of cusk isn't that

significant, in 1978 the value of the U.S. harvest from 5Ze
was approx. $150 thousand.

Yet it it one of those under-

utilized species, and the stock covered in this Agreement
is in an area of our FCZ.

What little was harvested in 1978

will be cut in half under the Agreement.

This treatment

raises questions of equity.
Atlantic Hepring:

For the stocks located in Areas 4WX and

5Y it was agreed that both sides would have "B" category
management responsibility in their respective zones,
although the U.S. had originally requested these stocks be
managed jointly.

However the management category in these

areas is of no real consequence as neither side has access
to the other's zone for any share.

The important aspect of

the herring settlement is with regard to the stock located
in Areas 5Z and 6.

Over this stock the U.S. will have

Category "B" management responsility.

As was the case in

most of the instances where the U.S. accepted "B" management in exclusive U.S. waters, this action was felt to be
an infringement on the management prerogatives of the industry
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and some fishery

man~gers.

Additionally, the Canadian

allocation for herring in 52 and 6 is a new one in the
sense that previously Canada has not taken any appreciable
amount of herring from this zone.

In the course of the

negotiations the Canadian share increased throughout, with
a final settlement of 2000 metric tons per year for the first
six years and thereafter one-third of the TAC.

This situation

could be troublesome for. those Southern New England fishermen
who have been attemptLng to develop this fishery in this area.
This development is evidenced by a 1978 harvest of 2100 metric
tons of herring in 52 and 6 compared to )61 metric tons
in 1977.
Sea Scallops:

The resolution and disposition of this

resource issue in Area 52e has been one of the more controversial, and there has been no satisfaction expressed by the
New England scallop industry with regard to the final management, access, and share settlements.

It is felt that Canada

secured rights totally out of proportion to their property
rights, which are only a legitimate claim to the disputed
zone.
During the negotiations there were a number of management
schemes proposed.

The final management plan provides that

the U.S· will have "B" authority to the west of the 68 10
west longitude line, and Canada will have "B"
the east of this line.

8uthority~

Additionally, setting the TAC and

size limits will be done jointly.
perceived with this arrangement.

There are several problems
First, west of this line

is clearly U.S. waters, yet again the U.S. accepted "B"

management.

Additionally, between this line and Canada's

Published line is an area of approximately 5,600 square
miles, which is also part of the U.S. FCZ, yet in these
waters Canada has the primary management reenonsility as
well as in the disputed zone.

As Canada harvests the great

majority of its scallops from the northeast portion of
Georges Bank, in the disputed zone , any movement of an
arbitrated boundary line toward the U.S. position (which is
a logical possibility) would place territory which is now
in dispute, and extremely important to the Canadian
scalloping effort, under U.S. jurisdiction.

By allowing

the management designation to be prematurely and permanently
set at the 68 30 west longitude line, the U.S· relinquished
management authority, as defined by the FCMA.
The final U.S. share of 26.65% is down 3.35% from its
original position while Canada compromised only 2%.

To get

Canada to concede these twa percentage points the U.S.
increased Canada's COd, haddock, and loligo squid allocations.

The problems with the final U.S. scallop share,

relevant to economic growth, has been explained in the
Introduction.

Further consider that the NMFS concludes

that on an average the U.S. scallop harvest in the disputed
zone is only 10% of the 5Ze total. _This could imply that
in 1978, of the total U.S. 5Ze harvest of 5569 metric tons,
5000 tons came from exclusive U.S. waters.

Additionally,

the NMFS concludes that on an average Canada takes 13% of
its 5Ze total from U.S. waters.-

Yet under the Agreement

the U.S. share in all of 5Ze, 3652 metric tons, is way
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below that which is available in U.S. waters.

As a side

note, the NERFMC is now in the process of formulating a
Scallop FMP, which will probably not incorporate the
TAC concept.
Another important advantage that Canada secured in the
scallop deal is the right of access throughout 52e.

This

will be important if Oanada is unable to sustain catch
levels, i.e. share entitlements, on the Nnrtheast Peak of
Georges Bank.

If the need arises Canadian fishermen will

have the right to come down into Southeast Georges and the
South Channel.
fishermen.

These areas are the important ones for U.S.

The potential for increased competition in a

constricted and heavily fished area imposes an additional
disadvantage on U.S. scallopers.
Atlantic Cod:

The stocks located in Areas 4VW, 4X, 5Y, and

$Z are covered by this Agreement.
for shares and

The Canadian proposals

management prevailed,throughout the negotia-

tions and comprise the final settlements.

For the stocks

in Areas 4VW and 5Y both sides have exclusive management
authori ty, category "C", in their respective zon es.

They

also have reciprocal access rights with a bycatch allocation
of 1.6%.

These terms represent a basic trade-off situation.

In area 4X Canada has category "C" authority, and the U.S.
share allocation is 7.5% of the TAC.

This U.S. share does

exceed what the U.S. has previously taken from 4X.

Consid-

ering this, the cost of fuel, and the relatively small
number of U.S. vessels which make the trip to 4X, the value
of the U.S. entitlement in 4X is somewhat questionable.
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Additionally, U.S. access in
areas.

4X

is restricted to offshore

The terms of this section in the Annexes prohibits

U.S. fishermen from cod fishing for the inshore stock on
the Nova Scotian shelf,at distances up to
Nova Scotian coast.

40

miles from the

This condition is viewed as a

tionist device for Canadian inshore fishermen.
the U.S. accepted category

"B"

protec~

In Area 5z

management authority, and

Canada is to receive 17% of the TAC.

Canada will have access

rights to within 12 miles of Cape Cod, where an inshore
stock of cod is located.

The U.S. side did not see cause

to adopt a device to protect inshore Cane fishermen, such
as Canadian fishermen 'will enjoy in

4X.

Also, the NMFS

concludes that 95% of Canadian ground fish harvested in
Area 5z comes from the disputed zone.

If this is the case

why was it necessary to extend Canada's access rights
throughout this area.
While the percentage points that both sides receive for cod
in the others' zone approximate past or present trends,
there are still some problems with the final share entitlements.

Using projected TAC figures, the U.S. will receive

approximately 1200 metric tons of cod from Canadian waters,
on an annual basis.

Canada will receive approximately

5300 metric tons from U.S. waters (including the disputed
zone).

The New England groundfish industry has been

declared conditional by the NERFMC, which means it is considered to possess the capacity to harvest as much groundfish
as is allowed under the FMP's, within our FCZ.

The point

has been made that Canada's allocation in 5Z should be equal
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to the U.S. allocation in 4X, and that any further
Canadian entitlement in U.S. waters should be subject to
the TALFF clause of the FCMA.

Granted these are very

selective arguements in this particular instance, but again,
this depends upon your perspective.
Haddock: The stocks located in Areas 4Vw, 4X, and 5 are
covered by the Agreement.

The Canadian proposals for

managem.nt and shares again comprise the final settlement.
The U.S· had requested that both sides manage haddock
according to category "B" procedure in their respective
zones.

Ostensibly this would have provided each side with

some management rights in the other's zone.

Canada agreed

with U.S. "B" management in Area 5, however they requested,
and secured, category "C" authority in Area 4.
As with cod the share entitlements approximate previous
trends, however this also is a conditional fishery.

The

Canadian allocation in Area 5 (6700 metric tons) is approximately three times the U.S. allocation in Area 4VWX (2400
metric tons).

The projected TAC for Area 5 alone is

32,000 metric tons, which is more than the U.S. receives for
all areas under the Agreement.
Silver & Red Hake:

For the stock located in Area 5Ze the

U.S. again accepted category "B" authority, with Canada having
a share entitlement of 10%.

The Canadian share will not

cut into U.S. harvest efforts because there are substantially
greater amounts of hake available in 5Ze than the U.S. is
currently utilizing.

Still, a 10% allocation is much great-

er than any type of previous Canadian harvest in this area.
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There have been questions raised as to the equity of
the hake settlement.

The fact is that historically the

U.S. has harvested more hake in Area
caught in $Ze.

4X

than CBnada has

The question is why wasn't the U.S., in

the interest of equity, given comparable share, management,
and access rights for hake in'Area
here is a matter of principle.

4X.

What is important

The domestic industry is

being asked to accept this Treaty because of the benefits
to be accured in doing so, but these are difficult to
perceive.
Atlantic Argentine:

5

For the stocks located in Areas

4

and

Canada will have the primary management responsibility,

An obvious question is why does CanadA, and

category "B".

not the U.S., have primary responsibility in Area

5.

In the

negotiations the

U.S~

had requested that it have primary

responsibility.

The answer is that at one point the U.S.

was willing to concede this if Canada would accept the US.
redfish proposal.

The ironic point is -that the U.S.

~ed

fish proposal at this point was not finally accented by
danada.

Also, the U.S. had originally requested 50% of the

TAC for its share entitlement but in the end accepted 25%.
The treatment of this stock is all almost comical because
in the 1965-77 period the total U.S./Canadian harvest of
argentine in these areas was zero.

Any inequities in the

final settlement of this stock is really a matter of
principle, and there is the question of the

fut~re

develop-

ment of underutilized species.
White Hake:

For the stocks located in Areas 4 and 5 both
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countries will have category
respective zones.

"B"

responsibility in their

This appears to have been the one species

for which the U.S. was able to maintain its position in
the negotiations, though this particular issue was not a
critical one.

Both sides will have reciprocal access rights

for" 6% of the TAC in the other's zone.
Illex Squid:

Another non-critical species issue with both

sides having category

"B"

responsibility in their respect-

ive zone, with neither side having access or share rights
in the other's zone.
Atlantic Redfish:
4RST, 4VWX, and

5.

The stocks located in Areas 3-0, 3P,
Both countries will have exclusive

jurisdiction over those stocks located in their respective
zones.

In Areas 3-0 and 3P the U.S. will have a share

entitlement of 600 metric tons per year.

In Areas 4RST the

U.S. will receive 10% of the TAC for vessels based outside
the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

It is doubtful whether any U.S.

fishermen will take advantage of these allocations.

Reason-

ing, in the last three years U.S. fishermen have not taken
any redfish from these areas, probably because of the
distance involved and high trip costs.
in Area

5

For the stock located

canada will receive only 1% of the TAC.

This is

low but approximates previous trends by Canada in this area.
The crux of the redfish settlement pertains to that stock
located in Area 4VWX, in which the U.S. 'o1ill have a share
entitlement of 35%.

In this larger area it is, in partie

ular, the northern portion of 4X that was important to
northern Maine redfishermen.

They have traditionally fished

in this area, evidenced by the fact that in the 196577 period U.S. fishermen harvested an annual catch of
7300 metric tons from 4VWX.

In the negotiations the U.S.

had requested 42.5% and ended up compromising 7.5% while
Canada's position altered only 2%.

The 35%

U.s.

entitle-

ment, using projected TAC's, will be approximately 5700
metric tons with a value of

$2.~

million.

This is an

increase of $1.5 million over the value of the 2146 metric
tons taken in 1978.
In reference to management the U.S. had requested that
Canada accept "B" category responsibilty for the management of redfish in Area
wise in Area

5.

obvious reason.

4vwx and the U.S. would do like-

This was a reasonable request for a very
The stock of redfish located in the north-

ern Gulf of Maine and to the west of the Nova Scotian coast
clearly interacts across the political lmne which divides

4X from 5Y.

This is obvious if one looks at stock distrib-

ution maps, in this case I used one nublished by the
Canadian Fisheries Service.

Also in 1978 the overall

harve~t

by U.S. redfishermen in this area was maintained despite
access into Canadian waters being curtailed in June of 1978.
This species, as much as any other covered by the Agreement
in this area, warranted mutual management, which would
have been 'Oossible under "B" category procedures.

The fact

that Canada secured exclusive authority, in the face of the
U.S· request, undermines one of the main justifications for
thi~

Treaty.

Also, all provisions pertaining to redfish

expire after ten years.
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Loligo Squid:

For the stock located in Areas 52, arid 6

the U.S. will have category "C" authority, and Canada
will have access rights throughout with 9% of the TAC as
a share entitlement.

In the course of the ntgotiations

Canada's share entitlement increased from a small bycatch

(l~)

to 9%.

This increase occured in relation to

the U.S. redfish allocation in 4VWX and also, in part,
to the scallop issue.

Canada's 9% entitlement, using

projected TAC's will be apuroximately 3960 metric tons
with a value of $4.1 million, ex-vessel.

This alloca-

tion is a new one in the sense that Canada has not
previously harvested squid in these areas.
pertaining to loligo squid also
period.

All provisions

expir~:after

a ten year

Ostensibly redfish and loligo deals cancel each

other out after a ten year period, however, one is a
traditional fishery and one is not.
Summary of Agreement Annexes:

Having touched on the various

components of the Annexes, this section will round out some
conclusions on the share, management, and access settlements.
In reference to shares the first thing to consider is the
conclusion reached by the NMFS in its short run economic impact
analysis of this Agreement.

As mentioned earlier a basic

assumption of this analysis is that fl:lture U.S. harvest (1980)
would be the same with or without a Treaty.

As I have pointed

out in the preceeding summaries this assumption is refuted by
recent growth rates and the availability of stocks.

The

conclusion of this analysis is that the U.S. fishing industry
will lose $4.327 million worth of resources if this Treaty does
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not enter into force.

This figure represents the value of the

U.S. allocation in Canadian waters.

It is true that without a

Treaty, Canada could deny U.S. fishermen access to these
resources.

It is pointed out that this lose will have a

concentrated adverse impact upon the ports of Rockland and
Portland, Me.,

b~cause

of this total, the value of the U.S.

redfish allocation in Canadian waters is $2.668 million, and
most redfish are landed in these ports.
This analysis stops at this point and is incomplete
because it makes no mention of what the U.S. industry will
lose under the Agreement nor does it detail the value of
Canada's allocation in U.S. waters.

By omitting these fActs,

and in conjuction with its' basie assumption, this economic
analysis simplifies the whole issue and creates the impression
that the U.S. industry can only gain from this Treaty.
The U.S. industry will lose approximately $12 • .5 million
the first year of the Agreement in its scallop and pollock
harvest.

This loss is relevant to 1978 harvest and the fact that

more of these resources are available in exclusive U.S. waters
than the U.S. is entitled to under the Treaty.

The reduction

for the scallop industry represents a $10 million dollar loss
and will certainly have a concentrated, adverse impact upon the
port of New Bedford.

This is especially true in light of recent

heavy investments in the scallop fleet, which was prompted in
part by increased harvests in the last couple of years.

A

forced redirection of effort into other fisheries, caused by
this type of cutback, will only intensify the pressure on
other

segment~

of the :1ndustJ"Y, such as the already conditional
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groundfishery.
There are t\IJo ways of looking at the value of the Canadian
allocation in U.S. waters.

The first is a total value/which

includes the resources which would be harvested by Canada in
the disputed zone.

This figure would be over $70 million dollars

which/while correct/is not entirely accurate due to the fact
that Canada does have a legitimate claim on this zone.

A more

accurate figure would reflect the value of those resources
which Canada will harvest in exclusive U.S. waters.
this required the following information.

To compute

The NMFS Data Summary

on this Agreement concludes that on an average, of its total
5Ze harvest, Canada has taken 95% of its groundfish and 90% of
its scallop from the disputed zone.

By applying these per-

centages to Canada's share entitlement it is possible to compute
that which will come from exclusive U.S. waters.

Included in

this would be the entire Canadian loligo squid allocation as this
all will be harvested in U.S. waters.

Computed in this fashion,

the value of Canada's share entitlement in the U.S. FCZ is
$10.695 million.
If Canada does harvest better than 90% of its total in the
disputed zone then why was it necessary to extend to Canada,
and guarantee permanently, access rights into such vast areas
of the U.S· FCZ.

This means that this $10 million figure could

be greatly exceeded in future years.

If Canadian fishermen are

unable to sustain their efforts on the Northeast peak of Georges
they have the guaranteed right to mbve

into established U.S.

fishing grounds, such as the South Channel and Southeast Georges.
Bear in mind that ICNAF Areas 5 and 6 are the only areas available to support the New England and Mid-Atlantic fishing industries.
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Increased competition in these limited geographical areas will
only place additional burdens on this industry.

On the other

hand, the Canadian Maritime Provinces have access into much
larger productive fishing grounds already located in their 200mile zone.

Again, a

subsid~zed

fleet is in a better position to

take advantage of extended access rights, and as such these rights
are of greater value.
It appears that Canada has secured exclusive management
authority for those stocks located in its' own 200-.ile zone,
which are of economic importance to the U.S. industry.

This

is category "C" authority for the cod, haddock, and redfish
located in Area

4,

and the U.S. will not have any input into

the formulation of management; plans for these species.

On the

other hand the U.S. accepted category "B" authority for scallops,
cod, haddock, herring, hake, etc., which are located in our FC'Z.
These stocks are of economic importance to Canada, and they have
insured themselves the right to participate in the management of
these.
It is the existence of a disputed zone which constitutes the
main justification for the rights Canada is to receive in U.S.
waters under the Agreement.

In this paper I have tried to show

that the implimentation of this Treaty, as is, will cause some
very real problems for the domestic industry.

The whole point

of this paper has been to emphasis' the need to settle the
boundary question first.

Then, any SUbsequent fisheries agree-

ment, and there is a:·need for coordinated management and conservation action, can be of a truly reciprocal nature, with both
sides operating from clearly established nositio~8.

This type

of situation could only be better than the present ambiguous one.
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Table 1 This table computes the value of Canada's share enti tlement from exclusive U.S. waters, not including the disputed
zone.

The NMFS Data Summary for this Agreement concludes that

on an average, of the total Canadian harvest in all U.S. waters,
90% of its scallop harvest and 95% of its groundfish harvest
comes from the disputed zone.

By subtracting these percentages

from Canada's total allocation in Areas 5 and 6 one can compute
the value of those resources which will come from exclusive U.S.
waters.

Included in this value is Canada's total allocation for

loligo squid as this resource is not found in the disputed zone.
Species

Area

Pollock
4VWX,5
Cusk
5Ze
Herring
5Z,6
Scallops
5Ze
Cod
5Y
Cod
5Z
Haddock
5
S. hake
5Ze
R. hake
5Ze
W. hake
5
Redfish
5
Loligo
Squid
5Z,6
Yellowtail
Flounder 5,6
Other
Groundfish 5

% from Metric tons
Ca. total
allocation U.S.FCZ from U.S. FCZ
metric tons

Value

29,7861
330
2,000
10,051
175
5,200
6,720
5,880
1,600
206
100

5%
5%
100%
10%
100%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%

260
16.5 2
20001005
175
260
336
294
80
10
5

96,720
6,613
266,000
5,617,950
95,725
142,220
237,552
17,404
19,360
3,u.4°
1,890

3,960

100%

3960

4,165,920

$

215

5%

10

14,350

485

5%

24

9,888

TOTAL

$10,695,052

1.
g.

.1

Of this total 17.5% is in Area 5 and of this 5% is from the U.S.
FCZ
This stock of herring is generally considered to be located to
the west of the disputed zone. In 1978 Canada did not harvest
any herring from the disputed zone, therefore the entire share
of 2,000 metric tons is computed.
J.. Bear in mind that under the Agreement, Can~dian fishermen will be
guaranteed access into eubstantial tracts of the U.S. FCZ beyond
the disputed zone. As such the value of the Canadian harvest
from the U.S. FCZ could greatly exceed this $10 million figure.
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Appendix A- A non-analytical synopsis of the Agreement
Annexes "A","B", and "C".

ATLANTIC MACKEREL
Stock:

Located in Subareas 3,4,5, and 6.

Management:

The total allowable catch and nermissible
commercial catch is to be determined under
Annex A, joint management.
All other management issues are determined
under Annex B procedures. Each party is
the narty of primary interest within its own
exclusive fisheries zone, and nending determination of the boundary in the disnuted area,
each is the party of primary interest with
respect to its own nationals and vessels
fishing in the disnuted area.

Access:

Vessels of each narty may fish in their
own exclusive fisheries zones, and pending
delimitation of the boundary, in the disnuted
area.

Entitlement:

60% u.S. , 40% Canada.

Additional
Terms:

The perties shall consult before allocating
any surplus and establishing requirements as
to third party fishing within their resnective
exclusive fisheries zones.
In the fourth year after entry into force
of the Agreement, the oarties shall consider
whether all management issues should be determined. under the procedures for Annex B. If
they do not agree, either party may refer the
issue to the Arbitrator for decision.

POLLOCK
Stock:

Located in Subarea 5 and Divisions 4V, 4W
and 4X.

Management:

Annex A, joint management.

Access:

Canadian vessels may fish in Divisions
4X, Subdivision 5Ze and the nortion of
5Y in the exclusive Canadian fisheries
U.S. vessels may fish in Subarea 5 and
4X.
25.6% u.S. 74.4% Canada.

Entitlement:

4V, 4W,
Division
zone.
Division

-CUSK
Stock:

Located in Subdivision 52e.

Management:

Annex A, joint management.

Access:

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Subdivision 52e.

Entitlement:

34% u.s.

66% Canada.

NORTHERN LOBSTER
Stock:

Located in the disnuted area.

Msnagement:

Annex A, joint management until delimitation
of the boundary at which time this stock will
no longer be recognized (see descrintion below).

Access:

The vessels of both parties may fish in the
disputed area until the boundary is delimited.

Entitlement:

"Neither narty shall expand their directed
fisheries for this stock, excent as authorized
by the Commission."

Stock:

Located outside the disputed zone.

Management:

Annex C, e9ch party shall determine the management measures within its exclusive fisheries zone.

Access:

Vessels of each party may fish only in their
respective exclusive fisheries zone.

Entitlement:

Each country is entitled to the total allowable
catch within its own zone.

Additional
Terms:

The parties agree to review the nossibility
of reciprocal access to exclusive fisheries
zones. If reciprocal access c~n be agreed
upon, but gear conflict provisions are in
disnute, either party may refer the gear
conflict question to the Arbitrator for
decision.
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ATLANTIC HERRING
Stock:

Located in Divisions 4W: and 4X and the Grand
Manan Banks in Division 5Y, but not including
juvenile herring within 3 miles of the Canadian
coast.

Management:

Annex B, Canada is narty of nrimary interest.

Access:

Canadian vessels may fish throughout Divisions
4W and 4X and the Grand Manan Banks oOl"tion of
Division 5Y. U.S. vessels may not fish in
these waters.

Entitlement:

0% U.S.

Stock:

Located in Division 5Y, excluding the Grand
Manan Banks and excluding juvenile herring
within three miles of the U.S. coast.

Management:

Annex B, U.S. is narty of nrimary interest.

Access:

U.S. vessels may fish throughout Division 5Y,
exceot in the Grand Menan Banks nortion.
Canadian vessels may not fish in these waters.

Entitlement:

100% U.S.

Stock:

Located in Subarea 6 and Division 5Z.

Management:

Annex B, U.S. is narty of nrimary interest.

Access:

Canadian vessels may fish in Subarea 6 and
Division 5Z east of 68 30' west longitude
only. U.S. vessels may fish in Subarea 6
and Division 5Z west of 66 west longitude
only.

Entitlement:

Years 1-3

100% Canada.

0% Canada.

2000 metric tons to Canada,
remainder un to nermissible
commercial catch to U.S.
Years 4-6 -- 2000 metric tons to Canada,
remainder un to nermissible
commercial catdh or 19,000
metric tons (whichever is less)
to U.S.; any additional nermissible commercial catch is
divided 50% u.s. and 50% Canada
unless total nermissible commercial catch exceeds 45,000 metric
tons in which case the additional
catch is divided 66.6'~ U.S.
and 33.33% Canada.
After Year 6-66.67% U.S., 33.33% Canada.
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Additional
Terms:

Auplicable to all herring stocke; after
three years, the narties are to review
management categorizations. If either narty
believes the data to be insufficient at that
time, another review is to be held after 6
years. After the second review of management categorizations, if no agreement is
reached, either party may refer the issue
to the Arbitrator for decision.

SEA SCALLOPS
Stock:

Located in Subdivision 5Ze

Management:

Annex B, Canada is party of primary interest
east of 68 30' west longitude. U.S. is party
of nrimary interest west of 68 30' west
longitude.Annex A joint management is provided
for management measures with respect to size
limits (e.g., shell sizes and meat counts).

Access:

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Subdivision 5Ze.

Entitlements:

26.65% U.S.

73.35% Canada.

ATLANTIC COD
Stock:

Located in Division 4W and Subdivision 4Vs

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access:

Vessels of both parties may fish throughout
Division 4W and Subdivision 4Vs.

Entitlement:

1.4% U.S.

Stock:

Located in a portion of Division 4X (south
and east of lines connecting coordinates
44 20' north latitude, 63 20' west longitude;
then 43 north latitUde, 65 40' west longitu~,
then 43 north latitUde, 67 40' west longitude).

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access:

Vessels of both parties may fish throughout
the portion of Division 4X suecified above.

Entitlement:

7.5% U.S.

Stock:

Located in Subarea 5Y.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively U.S.

Access:

Vessels of both parties may fish throughout
Subarea 5Y.

98.6% Canada.

92.5% Canada.
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Entitlement:

98.4% u.S.

1.6% Canada.

Stock:

Located in Division 52.

Management:

Annex B, U.S. is Darty of primary interest.

Access:

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Division 52.

Entitlement:

83% u.s.

17% Canada.

HADDOCK
Stock:

Located in Divisions 4V and 4W.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access:

Vessels of both uarties may fish throughout
Divisions 4V and 4W.

Entitlement:

10% U.S.

Stock:

Located in Division 4X.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access:

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Division 4X.

Entitlement:

10% U.S.

Stock:

Located in Subarea 5.

Management:

Annex B, u.s. is narty of urimary interest.

Access:

Vessels of both uarties may fish throughout
Subarea 5.

Entitlement:

79% u.s.

90% Canadian.

90% Canada.

21% Canada.

SILVER HAKE
Stock:

Loc-ated in Subd.ivision 52e.

Management:

Annex B, U.S. is narty of urimary interest.

Access:

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Subdivision 52e.

Entitlement:

90% u.s.

10% Canada.

RED HAKE

Stock:

Located in Subdivision 52e.

Management:

Annex B, U.S. is narty of nrimary interest.

Access:

Vessels of both parties may fish throughout
Subdivision 52e.

Entitlement:

90% U.s.

10% Canada.

ATLANTIC ARGENTINE
Stock:

Located in Sbuarea 5 and Divisions 4V, 4W and
4X'.

l-lanagement:

Annex B, Canada is narty of nrimary interest.

Access:

Vessels ,of'bothnartiesmey fish th~oughout
Subarea 5 and Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X.

Entitlement:

25% U.S.

75% Canada.

WHITE HAKE

4X.

Stock:

Located in Divisions 4V, 4W,

Management:

Annex B, Canada is uarty of urimary interest.

Access:

Canadian vessels may fish throughout Divisions
4V, 4W and 4X; U.S. vessels may fish in
Division 4X only.

Entitlement:

6% U.S.

Stock:

Located in Subarea 5.

Management:

Annex B, U.S. is uarty of urimary interest.

Acoe~s:

U.S. vessels may fish throughout Subarea 5;
Canadian vessels may fish only in Subdivision
5Ze and the p~rtion of Division 5Y in the
exclusive Canadian fisheries zone.

Entitlement:

94% U. S.

94% Canada.

6% Canada.

ILLEX SQUID
Stock:

Located in Subareas 3,4,5 and 6.

Management:

Annex B; Canada is uarty of urimary interest in
Subareas 3 and 4; u.s. is party of primary interest in Subareas 5 and 6.

.,.;.

Access;

Vessels of each narty may fish only in their
respective exclusive fisheries zone; no
fishing in disuuted area exceut by agreement.

Entitlement:

Does not apnly.

ATLANTIC REDFISH
Note: .

The nrovisions annlicable to the immediately
following four stocks (located in Divisions
4R, 4S, 4T, 4V, 4W, 4X; 3-0 and 3P)
terminate at the end of the tenth year after
entry into force of the Agreement.

Stock:

Located in Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access:

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X.

Entitlement:

35% u.S.

Stock:

Located in Divisions 4R, 4S and 4T.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access;

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Divisions 4R, 4S and 4T.

Entitlement:

To be determined under the new management
system, but must limit U.S. entitlement to
10% of the nermissible commercial catch for
vessels based outside the Gulf of St.
Lawrence. Canadian entitlement to include
remaining 90% nlus an unstated amount for
Canadian vessels based in the Gulf of St.
Lawrence.

Stock:

Located in Division 3-0.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Accesss

Vessels of both narties may fish throughout
Division 3-0.

Entitlement:

600 Metric tons U.S., unless after the
boundary delimitation the U.S. requests and
Canada agrees to exchange this entitlement for
an equal amount of the redfish stock located in
Division 3P, which would be SUbject to the same
tyne of management and access nrovisions: the
remainder of the catch is reserved for Canada.

65% Canada.
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Stock:

Located in Division 3P.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.

Access:

Canadian vessels may fish throughout
Division 3P o U.S. vessels may fish
throughout Division ,3P if an entitlement
is established (see preceeding stock).

Entitlement:

See preceeding stock.

Stock:

Located in Subarea

Management:

Annex C, exclusively U.S.

Access:

Vessels of both parties may fish throughout
Subarea 5.

Entitlement:

99% U.S.

5.

1% Canada.

(Provisions with respect to this stock do not lapse after
ten years).
LOLIGO SQUID
Note:

The provisions applicable to the following
stock terminate at the end of the tenth year
after entry into force of the Agreement.

Stock:

Subarea 6 and Division

Management:

Annex C, exclusively U.S.

Access:

Vessels of both parties may fish throughout
Subarea 6 and Division 52.

Entitlement:

91% U.S.

Additional
Terms:

52.

9% Oanada.

Management measures applicable to Canadian
vessels may be more restrictive than management measures applicable to U.S. vessels to the
extent reasonable necessary to limit incidental
catch and avoid gear conflict. Such measures,
however, shall be designed to assure Canadian
vessels the opportunity to catch their fUll
entitlement.

CERTAIN GROUNDFISH
Stocks:

Groundfish in Subareas 3 and 4, and not
expressly covered by any other provision in
the Annexes.

Management:

Annex C, exclusively Canadian.
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Access:

Canadian vessels may fish throughout Subareas
3 and 4; u.s. vessels may catch these stocks
only incidentally in fishing for other stocks.

Entitlement:

1% U.S.

Stocks:

Groundfish located in Subarea S, and not
exnressly covered by any other urovision
in the Annexes.

Ma.nagement:

Annex C, exclusively U.S.

Access:

U.S. vessels may fish throughout Suoarea S:
Canadian vessels may catch these stocks only
incidentally in fishing for other stocks.

Entitlement:

99% U.S.

Stocks:

Groundfish in Division 4X to which U.S.
vessels are given access under urovisions
in the Annexes, and which are located in the '
area from three to twelve miles from the
coast of Grand Manan I~land bu~ seaward of
12 miles from the coast of mainland Canada.

Management:

As nrovided for each stock.

Access:

U.S. vessels may fish this area, but access
is restricted to traditional Datterns of
fishing and levels of effort.

Entitlement:

As provided for each stock.

Additional
Terms:

99% Canada.

1% Canada.

Non-discriminatory Canadian gear conflict
regulations auply.
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